Why North Korea is in no hurry to do what the US wants

Meeting in Singapore last month, US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un captured the world’s attention and promised to work towards “new relations”. Why have mixed messages followed?

At the end of a summit billed as an “epochal event”, ambitions were set high.

North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to the “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”, while the US said it would stop “provocative” war games with South Korea.

So, why has there been a lack of clear progress?

North Korea’s notoriety and ability to capture global headlines may have led to its power being overestimated.

It appears Pyongyang has sought to disguise a position of relative weakness as one of unqualified strength. It framed the summit as one between equal nuclear powers.

North Korea is a misfit power. Despite its new-found confidence as a nuclear-armed country, it remains a weak state preoccupied by its very survival.

That its influence is disproportionately dependent on its military strength may, ironically, make it less willing to make serious concessions than the US and others have hoped.

North Korea may be one of the top military powers in Asia, but its emphasis is on quantity over quality.

The country’s 1.4m military and paramilitary personnel account for about 8% of its working-age population. Only China, Russia and India have larger standing armies.

By comparison, South Korea – which has more than twice the North’s population, and compulsory military service – has less than half the armed forces.

But it is its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons that enables the regime to make threats far beyond its immediate region.

However, to actually use this capability would be to provoke retaliation that would end the regime.

Pyongyang’s permanent war footing has come at an enormous cost.

This extreme military burden has been justified by invoking a siege mentality among its population, with chronic impoverishment explained away as the result of the actions of foreign aggressors.

The consequence is that, on all non-military measures of resources and influence, North Korea is flatlining.

In a dynamic and rapidly growing part of the world, North Korea is falling behind.

North Korea’s economy, when local prices are taken into account, is roughly the same size as that of Laos, one of the poorest countries in south-east Asia, which has just a quarter of the population.

Pyongyang’s diplomatic and economic relationships are similarly stunted.

And yet it does have links with a surprising number of countries.

North Korea also makes the best of the few friends it has.

Simply existing next to China benefits North Korea. A mutual defence treaty commits each country to providing military assistance to the other should it be attacked.

Economically, Beijing is a lifeline, with trade between the two countries accounting for 87% of North Korea’s total trade, according to research by the Lowy Institute.

That gives Beijing tremendous power to impose costs on Pyongyang if it so wishes.

Yet North Korea knows that while China has supported UN sanctions, it is likely to steer clear of more punishing measures.

That would risk the collapse of the regime and cause instability on its border.

North Korea is a wily survivor, but that is not the same as having broad-based international power.

Like its southern counterpart, North Korea claims to be the legitimate government of the entire peninsula.

But it has much less power than its neighbour.

It wields widespread influence in Asia, with well-developed trade and investment ties.

And it has cultural power to match – partly through a voracious regional appetite for K-pop and South Korean soap operas.

South Korea attracts 15.7 million tourists annually from across Asia, compared with the estimated 1.4 million Chinese tourists that visit North Korea each year.

By drawing the US president into talks – and partially normalising ties – Mr Kim appears to have played a weak hand well.

He praised Singapore’s economic success and promised to bring home lessons for North Korea’s progress. But he did not agree to a timeframe for denuclearisation.

The US wants North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons upfront and reap largely economic rewards in return.

Yet it is far from clear that Pyongyang sees economic development as being incompatible with keeping some form of nuclear power.

And its willingness to give up its signature weapons capabilities is likely to depend on whether it thinks reforming into a benign state would risk the collapse of the regime.

Even if it felt it could survive, North Korea might well have to submit to being South Korea’s junior partner.

It would be decades before income reaches levels seen in South Korea and with only half the population, it would be likely to remain in its shadow.

Is that too steep a price for the Kim dynasty to pay?